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ABSTRACT 
Airline Travel Demand, the Derived Demand for Aircraft Fuel, and Fuel Utilization 
Forecast Using Structural and Atheoretical Approaches 
YingFang 
In the first chapter, we develop a dynamic model of collusion in city-pair routes for 
selected US airlines and specify the first order conditions using a state-space 
representation that is estimated by Kalman-filtering techniques using the Databank lA 
(DBlA) Department of Transportation (DOT) data during the period 1979I-1988IV. We 
consider two airlines, American (AA) and United (UA) and four city pairs. Our measure 
of market power is based on the shadow value of long-run profits in a two person 
strategic dynamic game and we find evidence of relative market power of UA in three of 
the four city pairs we analyze. 
The second chapter explores three models of forecasting airline energy demand: Trend 
line, ARIMA and Structural Model based on results from Chapter 1 and find that none of 
them is a dominant winner in American (AA) and United (UA) between Chicago and Salt 
Lake City. 
In the third chapter, we use Model Averaging and Forecast Combination Techniques 
II 
------------------------------
to provide a decisive conclusion focusing on discussing Equal Weighted Averaging, Mean 
Square Weighted Averaging and Optimized Weighted Averaging on UA and AA in 
City-Pairs Chicago -Seattle and Chicago-San Diego. 
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Chapter 11 
A Dynamic Model of Airline Competition 
1.1. Introduction 
In this dissertation we analyze a number of issues pertaining to one of the most important 
transportation industries in the U.S., the commercial airline industry. The industry has 
continued to consolidate since it was deregulated in 1978, and we develop a structural 
dynamic competition model to better understand how one could evaluate if such 
consolidation has led to anticompetitive behavior on the part of firms competing in thin 
competitive markets, specifically particular city-pairs in which there is limited 
competition and possibly limited scope for the competitive fringe to force firms to price 
as perfect competitor would. We also are interested in one of the most important of the 
inputs to the airlines, their fuel needs, specifically turbo fuel. The U.S. commercial airline 
industry consumes 4% of the fuel used in the U.S. and understanding what influences the 
demand for fuel and how to best forecast the airline industry's future energy demands has 
import to the carriers themselves, for planning and operational decision, but also for 
world energy markets. We thus turn our focus on the use of our structural model for 
purposes of forecasting energy demands. Energy demands for commercial airlines have 
been addressed by Greene (1997), Faquih (2008) and etc. but none have used a structural 
1 Chapter 1 is based on Fang, Ying and Sickles, Robin C. (2007) and Fang, Ymg and Sickles, Robin C. (2008a) 
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model as ours. We also discuss and utilize various forecasting approaches that combined 
forecasts using various weighting schemes and we utilize these as well as specific 
forecasts from our structural model, ARIMA time series and simple time trends. A 
combined estimate or forecasts provide a decisive conclusion instead of a confusion of 
diversified results. 
1.2. Aviation Industry 
The aviation industry is defined as the design, manufacture, use, or operation of aircraft; 
the term aircraft refers to any vehicle capable of flight. Aircraft can either be heavier than 
air or lighter than air. Lighter than air craft includes balloons and airships, and heavier 
than air craft include airplanes, autogiros, gliders and helicopters. 
As early as 400 BCE, the Greek scholar Archytas, built a wooden pigeon that moved 
through the air, which is the earliest aviation experiment. The American Orville Wright 
and Wilbur Wright are generally credited with making the first controlled, powered, 
heavier-than-air human flight on December 17, 1903. In 1905 Charles and Gabriel Voisin, 
two French fliers, started the world's first aircraft company. The military value of aircraft 
was quickly recognized during World War I (1914-1918), and production increased 
significantly to meet the rising demand. More powerful motors, enabling aircraft to reach 
speeds of up to 130 miles per hour, were developed. After World War I, thousands of 
military planes were converted to civilian use. By 1917 the U.S. government adopted 
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something totally new, airmail. The Contract Air Mail Act of 1925 was the first major 
legislative step toward the creation of the private U.S. airline industry. Henry Ford, the 
automobile manufacturer, jumped into aircraft manufacturing and produced one of the 
first all-metal planes. On May 21, 1927, the pilot Charles Lindbergh flew across the 
Atlantic Ocean. This event made aviation an established industry by attracting millions of 
private investment dollars. For the airlines to attract more passengers away from the 
railroads, larger, faster, and safer airplanes were needed, and aircraft manufacturers 
responded to the challenge. There were so many improvements to aircraft in the 1930s 
that many people believe it was the most innovative period in aviation history. Newton's 
Third Law theorizes that a rearward-channeled explosion can propel a machine forward 
at a great rate of speed. The British pilot Frank Whittle applied this law to the first jet 
engine in 1930. During World War II, aircraft production became the world's leading 
manufacturing industry. 
Aviation is broadly grouped into three categories: general aviation, air transport aviation, 
and military aviation. By 194 7 all the basic technology needed for aviation had been 
developed, including jet propulsion, aerodynamics, and radar. Civilian aircraft orders 
drastically increased from 6,844 in 1941 to 40,000 by the end of 1945. Among the minor 
military contractors was the Boeing Company, which later became the largest aircraft 
manufacturer in the world. With all the new technologies developed by this time, airliners 
were larger and faster, and featured pressurized cabins. New aerodynamic designs, metals, 
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and power plants resulted in high- speed turbojet airplanes. By 1950 the airliner was 
well on the way to replacing the railroad and the ocean liner as the primary means of 
long-distance travel. The economic, social, and political consequences included the 
creation of global markets, opportunities for global travel undreamed of a generation 
before, and increasing cultural homogeneity. 
In 1938 the Civil Aeronautics Authority, an independent regulatory bureau, was 
developed. The airline industry resembled a public utility, with a government agency 
determining the routes each airline flew and overseeing the prices charged. On October 
24, 1978, the Airline Deregulation Act was approved. The industry became market -
driven, with customer demand determining the levels of service and price. A major 
development that followed deregulation was the widespread development of hub - and -
spoke networks, which enable the airlines to serve far more markets than they could with 
the same size fleet if they offered only direct, point - to - point service. Another 
important development following deregulation was the advent of computer reservation 
systems. These systems help airlines and travel agents keep track of fare and service 
changes, which occur rapidly. The systems also enable airlines and travel agents to 
efficiently process the millions of passengers who fly each day. In manufacturing, several 
mergers in the 1990's led to the disappearance of several historic U. S. airplane builders, 
such as McDonnell Douglas, which merged into Boeing. International partnerships 
became increasingly significant, with Airbus capturing one-third of the world market in 
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jet airliner sales in the 1990's. 
A number of researchers examined the impact of the 1978 Deregulation Act on the 
productivity of U.S. carriers and the demand for their services as well as how the 
international deregulation of the industry that accelerated in the ensuring years impacted 
the supply and demand for airline service world-wide. The studies pointed to an 
increase in efficiency of airline carriers due to increased competition, a provision of more 
service at lower prices, and an eroding of service quality as carriers competed on the 
basis of price instead of on the basis of in flight amenities and flight frequency with 
relative low load factors. Johnson (1991) believes that deregulation did not decrease 
airline employees' earnings, but increased union expenditures. 
On Sep. 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked four commercial airplanes and deliberately crashed 
two into the towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and one into the 
Pentagon building in Washington, D.C. The fourth hijacked plane crashed in Somerset 
County, Pennsylvania. After the hijackings, U.S. airports and airlines sought new ways to 
protect against terrorist attacks. Congress passed legislation requiring federal employees 
to handle all passenger and baggage inspection in U.S. airports by the end of2002. 
Fears of terrorism and a sluggish world economy contributed to a decline in air travel in the early 
2000's. In 2003, British Airways and Air France discontinued all Concorde flights because the flights 
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were no longer profitable. 
Although many countries continue to operate state-owned airlines, most large airlines in 
the early twenty-first century are privately owned and therefore governed by 
microeconomic principles to maximize shareholder profits. The airline industry as a 
whole has a cumulative loss during its history, once subsidies for aircraft development 
and airport construction are included in the cost. The lack of profitability and continuing 
government subsidies are justified with the argument that positive externalities, such as 
higher growth due to global mobility, outweigh microeconomic losses. A historically high 
level of government intervention in the airline industry can be seen as part of a wider 
political consensus on strategic forms of transport, such as highways and railways, both 
of which are also publicly funded in most parts of the world. 
U. S. airlines face substantial upheavals in the forms of mergers, failures, bankruptcy 
filings, reorganizations, and operating loss reports. This situation has raised concern that 
the future is bleak in terms of the number of carriers that will survive and prosper. 
Profitability is likely to improve as carriers find ways to be more cost - efficient and more 
competitive low-cost carriers proliferate. 
6 
1.3.Characterizing the Market for Airline Travel Demand 
We develop a dynamic model of collusion in airport-pair routes for selected U.S. airlines. 
What is City Pair and why is City Pair? In Airline bookings, City Pair is the departure and 
arrival cites on an itinerary. The number of city pairs served by an airline is sometimes 
used as a measure of its size. In the vast empirical economics literature on the airline 
industry, researchers typically study the impact of characteristics of an airline market on 
market outcomes. In order to carry out such studies, researchers must first make a choice: 
How to define the market? City Pair has been approved to be the best approach. Many 
empirical papers in the literature use the airport-pair approach to market definition. These 
studies include several early studies exploring the effect of market structure and 
competition on airfares following deregulation, (for example, Borenstein (1989, 1991), 
Brueckner, Dyer and Spiller (1992) or Brueckner and Spiller (1994) and numerous 
studies of the competitive effects of international alliances and antitrust immunity (e.g., 
Brueckner and Whalen (2000), Brueckner (2003), and Whalen (2007). The city-pair 
approach is followed by an alternative set of papers, including studies of competition and 
airfares by Berry (1990), Evans and Kessides (1993,1994), and Berry, Spiller and Camall 
(2006), studies of the impact of airline mergers (e.g., Werden, Joskow and Johnson 
(1991), Peters (2006)), studies of low cost carrier entry (e.g., Bogulaski, Ito and Lee 
(2004)), as well as numerous studies of domestic code sharing (e.g., Bamberger, Calton 
and Neumann (2004), Ito and Lee (2007) and Gayle(2008). Finally, another set of studies 
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that examine the effect of low cost carrier presence on market fares (e.g., Morrison(2001), 
Goolsbee and Syverson (2008), Brueckner, Lee and Singer (201 0)) use airport-pairs as 
the unit of observation, but allow for the impact of competition at the city pair level by 
explicitly modeling competitive effects from adjacent airports within a metro area. Berry 
(1992) considers the effect of an airline's scale of operation at an airport on the 
profitability of City Pair. Market definition is also a crucial factor guiding government 
regulatory decisions regarding the airline industry. For example, in evaluating proposed 
airline mergers, the post merger level of competition in airline market is a key concern. 
The competition analysis on a city-pair level can answer these kinds of question and give 
meaningful guidance to the government and to the public. With city-pair approach, we 
are able to exam airline industry in a more micro-analytic way. 
In earlier work on collusion and market power Roller and Sickles (2000) estimated a 
two-stage static structural model in which the firms play a repeated sequence of one-shot 
capacity and pricing games. They found that the market conduct parameter, whose 
value can differentiate among Bertrand, Cournot-Nash, and monopolistic equilibrium, 
had adjusted to a value closer to a competitive equilibrium as the industry was 
deregulated. Using a somewhat different time series approach Alam and Sickles (2000) 
looked at market conduct on the supply side (focusing on the degree of inefficiency) and 
found that a similar convergence to competitive equilibrium took place in the U.S. airline 
industry after its deregulation in 1976. Captain and Sickles (1997) utilized a one-stage 
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static structural model of market conduct for the European airlines in which labor choices 
were endogenous and where firms play a pricing game and estimated conduct to be 
between a competitive and Betrand solution. Unfortunately, these studies relying on the 
conjectural variations approach are myopic to the past and are not forward-looking when 
current actions are considered. Puller's (2007, 2009) models introduce dynamics in order 
to provide more realism in modeling dynamic decision making in the conduct parameter 
framework. While in the former model the reason for dynamics is fundamental (capacity 
choice), for the latter model it is strategic (repeated game). 
The models we specify and estimate in this chapter are based on the realistic assumption 
that firms consider the future when they make a current decision and that decisions they 
make today will influence outcomes in the future. In this sense it is similar in spirit to the 
work of Captain et al. (2007), although they did not estimate but rather calibrated their 
model. In this chapter we consider models that also allows for more flexibility in 
describing how equilibrium outcomes can be characterized. Solutions are not necessarily 
at the nodes of the solutions identified by the static market conduct approaches. As 
pointed out in Perl off et al. (2007), dynamic strategic considerations also often require new 
methods of estimation, such as the state-space methods which we employ herein, instead of 
the standard nonlinear least squares. Specifically, this chapter develops a dynamic model 
of collusion in city-pair routes for selected US airlines and specifies the first order 
conditions based on a state-space representation that is estimated by Kalman-filtering 
9 
techniques (1960). Our model controls for economy-wide exogenous variables and 
city-pair specific variables. We examine two U.S. commercial airline firms, United and 
American Airlines between 19791 and 1988IV. 
After the Airline deregulation Act of 1978 the airline industry moved from service-based to 
price-based competition. Carriers were able to set their own fares, select and drop routes, 
and control flight frequency. U.S. airlines continue to face substantial upheavals in the 
form of mergers, failures, bankruptcy filings, reorganizations, and operating losses. As 
the concentration of the industry continues to increase and as the number of profitable 
incumbents continues to dwindle, as fuel prices continue to soar, the survivability and 
prosperity of incumbents becomes increasingly problematic. In this economic and 
institutional setting the dynamics of strategic decision making involving various forms of 
collusion in the form of formal alliances are important to understand. Another empirically 
attractive feature of this industry, a consequence of the strict filing requirements imposed 
by the federal government, is the wealth of accessible data not generally available in most 
other industries. 
Before looking at the market power and the dynamics of airline carriers' interaction, we 
present and compare the traditional and new empirical models of market power -- the 
ability to raise price above marginal cost. We review the literature and methods to date, 
and focus particularly on dynamic models. Research on market power is important for 
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both policy makers and academics. It provides evidence that policy makers can use to 
improve antitrust and merger laws. It also allows academics to test theoretical models. 
Mason's (1939, 1949) structure-conduct-performance approach is the traditional one to 
empirical studies of market power. It holds that an industry's performance depends on the 
behavior of sellers and buyers, which depends on the structure of the market. The 
structure is summarized by the number of firms and the market shares. 
The modem static approach attempts to estimate the market power and to determine its 
causes by estimating optimality and other equation simultaneously. Bresnahan (1989) 
summarized most ofthe modem static approaches through the 1980's. 
There are three major types of modem static models, which are based on a single-period 
oligopoly model. 
Structural Models for Homogeneous Products 
The structural approach has two key advantages: providing a direct estimate of market 
power and simulating the effects of changes in the market as long as the changes do not 
affect the market structure. Structural models have been used to simulate the effects of 
mergers on price: Werden and Froeb (1994), Slade (1998), Nevo (2000), and Hausman 
and Leonard (2005). Its main disadvantage is that the results depend on a variety of 
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assumption on functional forms, distributions, and other facts that are not generally know 
to the econometrician. 
Comparative Statics for Homogeneous Products 
Suppose that firms face a constant marginal cost. A shock causes the marginal cost to rise. 
In Sumner (1981), Sullivan(1985), Ashenfelter and Sullivan (1987), a change in the tax 
rate or difference in the tax rate across states allows them to conduct a comparative statics 
experiment. If the market is competitive, the price will increase by the same amount as 
the marginal cost. Thus in principle, we can test for noncompetitive behavior by checking 
whether price moves disproportionately with marginal cost. 
Extended Structural Models for Differentiated Products 
In recent years, extended structural models for differentiated products allow us to 
examine richer questions: for example, constructing and testing a model of Stackelberg 
behavior since we can separately model the behavior of the individual firms in the 
market. 
The first major approach is to estimate the residual demand facing each firm. Starting 
from the multi-firm structural model, one derives an inverse residual demand function 
that is conditional on the firm's own quantity, structural demand variables, industry factor 
prices, other firm's cost variables, and other firms' behavioral parameters. 
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Bresnahan (1981a, 1987), Baker and Bresnahan (1988), Spiller and Favaro (1984), 
Suslow (1986), Gelfand and Spiller (1987), and Slade (1987) are important examples of 
residual demand or other differentiated product studies. 
The second approach is to estimate the full system of demand and optimality equations 
by a neoclassical demand model. A few of the best-known studies include Bresnahan 
(1981, 1987) and Hausman (1997). In this approach, a system of demand equations is 
estimated using restrictions from economic theory. Based on these estimates and some 
information about cost curves, the econometrician then uses the estimated elasticities of 
demand to determine the degree of market power. 
In the other approach, consumer or other micro-data are used to estimate consumer 
demands. The best-known studies using this approach employ a random utility model. A 
widely used approach to estimating the demand elasticity is to use a linear random utility 
model from Perloff and Salop (1985) and Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992). 
Some of the best-known applications of this approach to estimate market power in a 
differentiated goods market are Berry et al. (1995), Goldberg (1995), Nevo (2001), and 
Pinske et al. (2002). Berry et al. (1995) estimate automobile demand system using 
product-level price and quantity data. Their demand estimates reflect the sum of 
individual purchase probabilities. Goldberg (1995) uses household-level, new car 
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purchasing data to estimate the probabilities that a household purchases a given model. 
She then uses these household probabilities to determine the demand curve that firms 
face. Nevo (2001) decomposes his estimated price-cost margins into margins due to 
product differentiation, multi-product firm pricing, and potential price collusion. He 
concludes that the first two factors explain most of the observed price-cost differentials. 
Pinske et al. (2002) provide an alternative approach where the differentiation is due to 
spatial competition. They use a semi-parametric approach to estimate cross-price 
response coefficients. 
Compared to the aggregate structural model, a key advantage of all these models is better 
estimates of the demand and optimality equations, allowing own- and cross-elasticities to 
vary across brands, which presumably results in more reliable demand estimates in the 
real world. 
Until now, we have discussed estimating market power under the assumption that firms 
engage in a sequence of static games: In each period, a firm maximizes its current profit 
given its belief about how its rivals behave and assuming that actions in other period do 
not affect behavior in this period. We now examine how to model games in which firms 
interact over many periods: where they play a dynamic game. Each firm maximizes its 
expected present discounted value of the stream of current and future profits. When each 
firm solves a dynamic optimization problem where its payoff depends on the behavior of 
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other firms, the industry equilibrium is the solution to a dynamic game. We distinguish 
dynamic game between two types of reasons: strategic and fundamental. If dynamic 
interactions arise because firms think that their rivals' will respond in the future to their 
current action, we say that the reason is strategic. If a firm solves a dynamic rather than a 
static problem because its current decision affects a stock variable that affects its future 
profits, we say that the reason for the dynamics is fundamental. 
We examine environments in which the only reason for dynamics is strategic. We start by 
reviewing the basic concepts from game theory involving many period games, including 
subgame perfection and Folk theorem of supergames. A subgame is a game begins with a 
particular history. An equilibrium is sub game perfect if the set of decision rules constitute 
an equilibrium for any possible history, that is, for any possible sub game, not only for the 
subgames that arise in equilibrium. The Folk theorem of supergames states that if 
players are sufficiently patient, discount factor is sufficiently close to 1, then any feasible, 
individually rational payoff can be supported in a subgame perfect equilibrium 
(Fudenberg and Tirole 1993, Chapter 5.1 ). A payoff is individually rational if it is greater 
than or equal to the minimum payoff that a player can guarantee. 
There are two different approaches to formulating empirical models based on repeated 
games. The first approach assumes that firms use trigger strategies, and the second 
assumes that firms use strategies that are continuous in the history. 
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The models proposed by Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) and Green and Porter (1984) are 
examples of repeated game models that provide a basis for estimation. Both these 
models assume that tacit cooperation is supported by the threat of reversion to 
non-cooperative actions: firms use trigger strategies. The extent of the cooperation 
changes randomly, due to the presence of random shocks. Finns use a simple punishment 
strategy: they behave "cooperatively'' as long as their rival has behaved cooperatively in 
the past. Cheating by any firms causes all firms to use the non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium price (of the one-shot game) at every period in the future. The assumption 
that the demand shocks are uncorrelated is important, because it implies that the cost of 
cheating is the same in each state of nature. Kandori (1991) and Haltiwanger and 
Harrington (1991) study the model with correlated demand shocks. Porter (1983) and 
Lee and Porter (1984) test variations of the Green and Porter model using U.S. railroad 
pricing data from the 1880's. Their results are consistent with Green and Porter (1984) 
model of trigger strategies. Hajivasilious (1989) reaches similar conclusions. However, 
Town (1991) finds that price wars were not related to demand fluctAAtions. This 
finding is contrary to the predictions of both the Green and Porter (1984) and the 
Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) models. Domovitz et al. (1987) find little evidence of 
price wars either in booms or recessions. Suslow (1998) presents evidence that conflicts 
with the predictions of the Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) model. In an examination of 
pre-World War II cartels, she finds that a cartel is more likely to break down during 
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recessions and depressions. Recent theoretical developments have built on the 
Rotemberg and Saloner and the Green and Porter models. For example, Athey et al. (2004) 
study an infinitely repeated Bertrand game in which firms receive independent and 
identically distribution cost shocks. Using a two-player game in which firms imperfectly 
monitor their rival's actions, Matsushima (2004) shows that the collusive outcome can be 
sustained when the discount factor is close to one. 
In the trigger strategy models, certain observations, such as low sales or a low market 
price, trigger a temporary or permanent breakdown in cooperation. These strategies are 
discontinuous in the history: a small difference in the history can lead to a large 
difference in behavior. An alternative is for firms to use strategies that are continuous in 
the history. With these strategies, a small deviation from cooperation causes a small 
change in the history, and leads to a small punishment. Slade (1989) models a 
price-setting game with continuous reaction functions. The equilibrium with continuous 
reaction function is "approximately" subgame perfect when the discount factor is larger. 
In this equilibrium firms never cheat and they never need to punish each other. However, 
random demand shocks mean that there are periods where firms are groping towards a 
new equilibrium as they learn the new demand parameters. 
We now focus on games in which dynamics arise because of changes in economic 
fundamentals. This type of game is often referred to as a dynamic game or a stochastic 
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game. There are two major fundamental sources of dynamics: production and demand. 
The firms' factors of production are variable, fixed, or quasi-fixed, depending on the cost 
of changing their level. When production involves quasi-fixed inputs, a firm needs to 
solve a dynamic optimization problem, regardless of the market structure. A growing 
empirical literature attempts to estimate adjustment costs and to distinguish between 
variable and quasi-fixed inputs in competitive markets: Pindyck and Rotemberg (1983), 
Epstein and Denny (1983), Hayashi and Inoue (1991), Luh and Stefanou (1991), 
Frenandex-Comejo et al (1992), Anderson (1993), Burh and Kim (1997), Hall (2002). 
Advertising and consumer switching are two reasons why current demand may depend on 
past actions, so that firms operate in a dynamic environment. Advertising can create a 
stock effect. Current advertising may have long-lasting effects by increasing the number 
of the firm's customers today and in the future. The value of current advertising depends 
on the current stock of potential customers. The link between the optimal decisions in 
different periods makes the firm's problem dynamic. 
Most applications of dynamic games assume that agents use either open-loop or Markov 
decision rules. Open-loop Nash equilibrium rules are time consistent, but typically not 
subgame perfect. With open-loop strategies, we can nest a family of equilibria, including 
competitive, non-cooperative Nash and collusive equilibria. Markov Strategies are 
decision rules that depend only on the directly payoff-relevant state variable. A 
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subgame-perfect Markov equilibrium is referred to as a Markov perfect equilibrium 
(MPE). The past ten years has been an explosion of papers that estimate Markov perfect 
equilibria. Recent papers, including Pakes et al. (2004) and Bajari et al. (2004), provide 
new estimation methods and reviews of earlier work. This estimation strategy can be 
modified so that it permits the identification of the industry structure. That is, it enables 
the researcher to test whether firms are playing a non-cooperative game, acting 
collusively, or behaving as price takers. 
A conjectural variation or a market conduct parameter model is used to estimate market 
structure under the assumption that the equilibrium is either open loop or Markov perfect. 
This model requires that the single-period payoff is a quadratic function of the state and 
the control variables that the equation of motion is linear in those variables, and that 
agents use linear decision rules. Under these restrictions, we can solve the equilibrium 
conditions in closed form to obtain the decision rules, which are linear in the state 
variables. 
Golan, Karp and Perloff (1998, 2000) developed a framework for modeling an 
oligopolistic game over a discrete action space. This approach allows us to use sample 
data as well as the game-theoretic first-order conditions to estimate pure or mixed 
strategies for each one of the players. They then formulated three models to solve the 
firms' strategies. The first one is a simple ME-ML (maximum entropy-multinomiallogit) 
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that cannot incorporate the game theoretic restrictions into the estimation process. The 
second one is the multinomial GME which is more efficient than the first model but also 
did not incorporate the game-theoretic restrictions. The third model is the GME-Nash 
model that provides a simple framework for a simultaneous estimation of both firms' 
strategies while taking into account all of the available data and the game-theoretic 
conditions. 
1.4. A New Dynamic Structural Model of Airline Travel 
Demand 
Now, let's discuss rationale for collusion and market power. Standard economic theory 
predicts that under mild assumptions when there are only a few agents on one side of a 
market those agents will often possess market power---the ability to alter profitably prices 
away from competitive levels without losing all customers to competitors. The Cournot 
model of duopoly assumes that a firm never had to consider the reaction of its competitor 
to its price or quantity choice. In the Bertrand model, a firm could undercut its rival's 
price at the margin and compete-away all of the rival's customers. In practice, however, a 
firm may recognize that if it undercut its rival the rival will respond by cutting its own 
price, ultimately leading to a short-run gain in sales but a long-run reduction in the price 
level. 
Consider a dynamic model in which these concerns arise. Each firm i 
attempts to maximize the discounted value of profits, ~00 pt-1 ~t=l !!it , where is firm 
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i 's profit in period t . If each firm initially charges Pm , the monopoly price, then 
industry profit is maximized. It continues to charge Pm in period t if in every 
period preceding t both firms have charged Pm ; otherwise it sets its price at 
marginal cost c forever. This is equilibrium if the discount factor is sufficient high. 
In charging pm the firm earns half the monopoly profit in each period. By deviating 
from this price, a firm can earn maximum profit, rrm 'during the period of deviation 
but it receives zero forever. Therefore, if lf(l + p + P2 + ... ) ~ rrm ' if p ~ t ' then 
these strategies are equilibrium ones, which are also called trigger strategies. There are 
many other equilibria in this game, any price between the competitive price and the 
monopoly price can be sustained as an equilibrium price as long as the discount factor is 
greater than f . The Folk Theorem summarizes this outcome: in an infinite repeated 
game, any feasible discounted payoffs that give each player, on a per-period basis, more 
than the lowest payoff that he could guarantee himself in a single play of the 
simultaneous-move component game can be sustained as the payoffs of an subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium if players discount the future to a sufficiently small degree. 
Now, let's discuss rationale for Dynamic Decision Making. Beginning with the classic 
work of Chamberlin (1929), researchers have continued to explore the implications of 
repeated interaction between collusive oligopolists as well as factors that may hinder such 
collusion in repeated pricing games. Consider a small number of identical firms 
producing a homogeneous product. Chamberlin conjectured that the firms in the 
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industry would charge the monopoly price. Each firm makes profit II m 1 n , where 
rrm =II(pm) . As Chamberlin noted, detection lags and asymmetries between firms are 
two factors that may hinder collusion. Tacit collusion is enforced by the threat of 
retaliation. But retaliation can occur only when it is learned that some member of the 
industry has deviated. For example, before the existence of online travel companies, the 
prices charged by airlines may be somewhat hidden. But in the current environment, and 
to some degree in the environment that existed during our sample period, the prices 
charged by an airline can be observed fairly quickly by its competitors. 
Oligopolists are likely to recognize that one threat to collusion is lack of secrecy 
and consequently may take steps to control it. An example is Orbitz, which is an online 
travel company funded by five airlines, American, Continental, Delta, Northwest and 
United. Under asymmetric conditions, the oligopolists' marginal costs may differ and 
thus they have different monopoly prices. Low-cost firms would prefer to coordinate on a 
lower price than the higher-cost firms. Theory suggests that as an industry becomes more 
competitive, it becomes more important for a firm to perform efficiently relative to other 
firms if it is going to survive. This is one of the sources of dynamic productive 
efficiency revealed in the U.S. airline industry after deregulation by Alam and Sickles 
(2000). But, how does market power for airlines arise? Do they arise from barriers to 
entry, from sunk costs of gate and slot access, scale and network economies, or from 
hub-and-spoke systems which can give carriers market power even on relatively 
competitive routes? Borenstein (1989), among others, has estimated the importance of 
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route and airport dominance in determining the degree of market power exercised by an 
airline. His results indicate that an airline's share of passengers on a route and at the 
endpoint airports significantly influence its ability to mark up price above cost. The high 
markups of a dominant airline, however, do not create much of an "umbrella" effect from 
which carriers with smaller operations in the same markets can benefit. Other rationale 
for market power on routes come from Berry (1992) who pointed out that airline firms 
are suited to serve different routes by virtue of unobserved heterogeneities (market niches) 
that allow them to exploit monopoly power over their differentiated product. An 
alternative view is found in the work of Morrison and Winston (2000) who examine 
merger activity and the factors that influence them for the U.S. airlines. They make the 
empirical argument that mergers are not driven by a desire to obtain market power but 
rather by the acquiring carriers' desire to expand their international routes. These routes 
tend to be more profitable on average than domestic routes because of bilateral 
agreements that limit entry. Moreover, the acquired carriers often have strong 
incentives to merge because of poor financial prospects (Crandall and Winston, 2006). 
There is a substantial body of literature that has examined the reasons for and against the 
presence of market power in the commercial airline industry. What we consider below 
is an econometric model that can provide evidence for or against such market power in a 
dynamic setting of strategically interacting carriers at a level of disaggregation that 
provides us the best empirical measures of such potential conduct, which is the city pair 
route. 
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Most existing methods for estimating market power are based on the assumption of a 
static equilibrium and use standard econometric techniques, such as ordinary least 
squares and instrumental variables. Most previous literature estimates only the degree of 
market power and ignores the role of strategies. This chapter examines dynamic models 
of oligopoly. This research is important. It provides evidence that can be used by policy 
makers in devising optimal antitrust laws. It can be used in court cases. It also allows 
academics to test theoretical model~ that were previously accepted on faith. Previous 
literature mainly focused on answering two questions: How much market power do firms 
have? What factors (such as barriers to entry) determine market power? This chapter 
adds one more discussion: what strategies do firms use and how do these strategies affect 
market power? 
We frame the model as a dynamic programming problem, Firml-AA's dynamic 
program is 
on choosing output q~,t . While for Firm2-UA, its dynamic program is 
on choosing output q~,t, where p is the discount factor, the c subscript refers to 
an city pair, the t subscript is the time period, Xt are economy-wide exogenous 
variables, and zc,t are city-pair specific exogenous variables. The parameter p is at 
0.90 in our analysis below. 
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There are a variety of ways that we can allow the exogenous variables to 
influence the shadow value of q~,t· We outline three different methods. First, we can 
write the first-order condition for AA (Firml) as 
I I Bp!.t ac! I D P< 111 I 112 2 113 I 114 I ) 0 
Pc,t + qc,t -~---~- + ac,t c + At qc,t +At qc,t +At XI+!+ At zt+! = 
8qc,t 8qc,t 
and the first-order condition for UA (Firm2) as 
2 2 ap;,t 8c2 2 D P< 121 I 122 2 123 2 124 2 ) 0 
Pc,t +qc,t -2---2-+ac,t c + At qc,t +A, qc,t +A, XI+! +A, zt+! = 
8qc,t aqc,t 
where De is a dummy for the particular city pair c . The above two equations are 
the measurement equations which will be used in the Kalman filters. Below is a complete 
discussion of how the Kalman filter is set up for this problem. 
Shadow price calculation is an important by produce of the dynamic program and 
is useful in analyzing equilibrium strategies and market power. Let's first look at a 
simplest optimization problem --- two variables and one equality constraint: 
max f(x,y) 
subject to 
h(x,y) =a 
Let 1 and h be C1 functions of two variables. For any fixed value of the 
parameter a , let (x*(a),y*(a)) be the solution of the above problem with 
corresponding multiplier 1-/(a) . Suppose that • • X ,y' and • f.L 
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functions of a and that the nondegenerate constraint qAAlification (NDCQ) holds at 
(x*(a),y*(a),,u*(a)) . Then 
p: (a)=..!!:..._ f(x* (a), y• (a)) 
da 
The Lagrangian for this problem is 
L(x,y,p;a) = f(x,y)- p(h(x,y)- a) 
The optimal solutions for (x*(a),y*(a),,u*(a)) must satisfy 
0 = BL (x* (a), y• (a), p* (a); a)= Bf (x* (a), y• (a), p* (a))- p* (a) Bh (x* (a), y• (a), p* (a)) & & & 
forall a . Since h(x*(a),y*(a))=a itmustbethat 
ah < • *) dx* < ) oh < • • dy* < ) 
- x ,y -a +- x ,y )-a =1 
iJx da iJy da 
for every a . Therefore, using the Chain Rule, 
..!!:..._ f(x*(a),y*(a))= Bf (x*(a),y*(a))dx* (a)+ Of (x*(a),y*(a))dy* (a) 
da iJx . da iJy da 
= ,u* (a) Bh (x* (a),y* (a)) dx* (a)+ .u· (a) oh (x* (a),y* (a),,u* (a)) dy* (a) 
iJx da iJy da 
= .u· (a)[0h (x* (a),y* (a)) dx* (a)+ oh (x* (a),y* (a),,u* (a)) dy* (a)] 
iJx da iJy da 
= ,u*(a)·l 
and ,u*(a) measures the rate of change of the optimal value of f with respect to 
the parameter a . It is not hard to extend the above to the setting below. 
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Let f hl, ... ,hm be function on 
b = (b1, ••• ,bm),c = (cp ... ,ck) be exogenous parameters . Consider the problem of 
maximizing f(x1, ••• ,xn) subject to the constraints 
and inequality constraints 
Let denote the solution of this problem, with corresponding Lagrange 
multipliers .ut (b), ... , ,u; (b), A; ( c ), ... l: (c) . Suppose further that the x; 's are 
f.L; 's and A,* s are differentiable 
function of (b1, ••• ,bm) and (cp ... ,ck), respectively, and NDCQ holds. Then for each 
j = l, ... m 
f.L;(i1, .. hm) =a~. f(x;<i1.··hm,c!, .. .ck), .. x:<b!,""hm,c!, .. .ck)) 
J 
and for each s = 1, ... , k 
We can specify the objective function f(x) as the profit function of a firm 
and interpret the aj 's on the right-hand sides of the constraints as representing the 
amounts available for inputs in the firm's production process. In this situation, 
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represents the change in the optimal profit resulting from the availability of one more unit 
of input j and indicates how valuable another unit of input j would be to the firm's profits. 
Alternatively, it tells the maximum amount the firm would be willing to pay to acquire 
another unit of inputj. For this reason, IL~ (a) is called the shadow price of inputj. 
1 The shadow value of q c,t is 
111 1 112 2 113 1 114 1 
/Lt qc,t + /Lt qc,t + /Lt xt+1 + /Lt zt+1 
and indicates the extent of market power for AA while the shadow value of IS 
121 1 122 2 123 2 124 2 
/Lt qc t + /Lt qc t + /Lt xt+1 + "'t zt+1 
' ' 
and provides us a similar measure of market power for AA. 
The Kalman filter for AA (Firml) is 
1 I Op!,t OC1 I D /3(111 I 112 2 113 I 114 I ) 0 
Pc,t +qc,,-1---~-+ac,t c + /L, qc,t +/L, qc,t +/L, xt+t +/L, z,+l = <=> 
oqc,t oqc,t 
( OC1 I I 0P!.t )p-1 I DC 111 I 112 2 113 I 114 I -~-- Pc,t- qc,t ~ = ac,t f3 + /L, qc,t + /L, qc,t + /L, xt+l + /L, z,+l <=> 
oqc,t qc,t 
where 
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while for UA (Firm2) the Kalman filter is 
a 2 2 
2 2 Pc,l ac 2 D p( 121 1 122 2 123 2 124 2 ) 0 
p c,l + q c,l -2---2-+ ac,l c + /1,1 q c,l + /1,1 q c,l + /1,1 xt+1 + /1,1 zt+1 = <=> 
aqc,l aqc,l 
( ac2 2 2 ap;,l )p-1 2 DC 121 1 122 2 123 2 124 2 
aq2 - Pc,l - qc.1 82 = ac,l p + /1,1 qc,l + /1,1 qc,l + /1,1 xt+1 + /1,1 zt+1 <=> 
c,l qc,l 
where 
a 2 a 2 
y2 = (-c- _ 2 _ 2 Pc,l )p-1 
I a 2 p c,l q c,l a 2 
qc,l qc,l 
X2' (Dc 1 2 2 2 ) 
1 = p'qc,l,qc,t'Xt+l'Zt+1 
B 2' ( 2 121 122 123 124) I = ac,t' /1,1 '/1,1 '/1,1 '/1,1 
The state equations are not defined. One possibility is a simple auto-regression for both 
carriers such as 
B1 B1 1 
t = t-1 +vt 
B2 B2 2 
t = 1-1 + vt 
while another possibility is to include the strictly exogenous variables. 
Second, we can use the same approach as above, but assume that the coefficients 
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on the x and z terms are constants (no t subscripts): A? and 24 • Now we 
only have to determine two terms using Kalman filters. Third, we can reduce the number 
of A terms. For AA (Firml) we can write 
a 1 1 
1 1 'Pc,t ac 1 D p[111 1 112 2 1B/( 1 1 )] O Pc,t +qc,t_1 ___ 1-+ac,t c + At qc,t +At qc,t +At xt+i'zt+1 = 
aqc,t aqc,t 
and for AA (Firm2) we can write 
a 2 2 
2 2 'Pc,t 8c 2 D p[121 1 122 2 12J/( 2 2 )] O Pc,t +qct_2 ___ 2-+act c + At qct +At qct +At xt+1,zt+1 = 
· oq oq · · · c,t c,t 
We now have three A terms that we need to determine using Kalman filters. We 
could allow to be determined by a Kalman filter that depends on x and not on 
z . The state equations are then 
A." =p" +p"A." +p"xi +p"q1 +p"q2 +6 I 0 I 1-1 2 1+1 3 I 4 I I 
212 = p12 + PI2 AI2 + PI2 XI + PI2ql + PI2q2 + 6 
I 0 I 1-1 2 t+l 3 I 4 I I 
A21 =p2I +p2IA21 +p2IX2 +p2Iql +p2Iq2 +6 I 0 I 1-1 2 t+1 3 I 4 I I 
222 = p22 + p22 222 + p22 x2 + p22qi + p22q2 + 6 
I 0 I 1-1 2 t+l 3 I 4 I I 
Providing that f is linear in z and providing that we know p , the first order 
condition is linear in parameters and can be estimated using the linear Kalman Filter. 
The estimation results reported below are based on the first method discussed above. The 
state equation is defined as a simple auto-regression. Since we estimate the model by 
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each city pair, De is dropped. We include De when we compare AA with AA 
by multiple city pairs. 
We illustrate in detail how we derive the estimated results of AA between city-pair 
Chicago (ORD) and San Diego (SAN). Estimates for other city-pairs are 
straightforward extensions. The first-order condition for AA (Firm 1) between city pair 
Chicago (ORD) and San Diego (SAN) is: 
where 
We assume a simple demand function given by 
p = A - Q = A - qi - q2 
where A is a constant. 
We use estimates of the average cost when route is defined by city pair (avcstcty), 
average price when the route is a city pair (avgprcty), and the number of passengers on a 
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route (rtpass) from Perloff et al. (2003). Our results are based on an assumed discount 
factor p of 0. 9, but a value of 0.95 was also examined and the results were 
qualitatively similar. This yields the following equation 
We use national per capita income (pcinc) as an economy-wide exogenous variable Xr 
and Herfindahl index for city pair (herfcty) as an city-pair specific exogenous variable 
Zt which appears to be the best city-pair specific exogenous variable we could find in 
the available data. In this context then 
X 1' ( 1 1 2 1 1 ) ( 1 1 2 • 1 h f 1 ) 1 = -,ql'q1 ,x1+pz1+1 = -,rtpass1 ,rtpass1 ,pcznc1+1, er cty1+1 p 0.9 
B 1' ( 111 12 113 114) , = a,/1,, ,q, ,/I,, ,/I,, 
We look at a set of city pairs in which American and United are dominant firms and 
assume that the competitive environment in which the firms compete is Markovian. The 
source of data was the Databank lA (DBlA) ofthe Department ofTransportation (DOT). 
DBlA, collected quarterly, provides a 10% sample of all tickets sold for travel on US 
airlines. The level of observation in this dataset is the airline-route-routing-quarter. Each 
observation contains information on the carrier flown, the route traveled (the origin and 
destination airports), the routing (direct service or connecting service through a particular 
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airport), the quarter of travel, the type of ticket (one-way, roundtrip or open-jaw), the 
dollar fare paid and the distance of the trip. The data also contain a variable indicating the 
point of purchase of the ticket, which allows departing and returning legs of roundtrip 
tickets to be distinguished. Unfortunately, the data do not contain any information on the 
details of the ticket, such as whether the ticket required a Saturday night stay-over or 
whether the ticket was purchased 7 or 14 days in advance. The data also do not identify 
the date or time of travel (only the quarter), so observations cannot be matched to 
particular days of the week or specific flight numbers. The data are taken directly from 
airline ticket stubs and, along with the total ticket price; the data contains such 
information as the carrier, origin, destination, and class for all trip segments. The data are 
by airline and by quarter from 19791-1988IV. In many cases our choice of study period is 
interesting because many fare innovations and service quality changes occurs during this 
time period following the deregulation of the industry in 1978. The airlines we discuss in 
this chapter are American and United. Economy-wide exogenous variables and city pair 
specific variables are important controls in the model and consist of; the existence of a 
frequent flier program, strikes, alliances, the Gulf War, the air controller's strike under the 
Reagan Administration, mergers, price of jet fuel and national taxes on airlines. The 
city-pair specific exogenous variables consist of city pair and region dummies, 
international airport dummies, delays, entry and exit, share of minor carriers on the route, 
unemployment rate for each city, percent change in state GDP and relative or actual 
marginal cost. 
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These variables have been examined in a somewhat different reduced form market power 
setting in Weiher, Sickles and Perloff (2003) and in the context of constructing a hedonic 
airline price index (Good, Sickles and Weiher, 2007). 
Good, Sickles and Weiher (2007) estimates a quality-adjusted price index for airline fares 
using a hedonic price regression which includes quality characteristics as well as time 
dummies based on DOT origin and destination (O&D). When the products under 
consideration are simple homogeneous commodities, CPI is best computed. But CPI does 
not describe the air transport industry, because air travel takes place between different 
origins and destinations over alternative paths and with differing levels of service. Good, 
Sickles and Weiher (2007) consider three hedonic characteristics of the airlines. Network 
configuration: the indirectness of routing, change of planes, and the number of airlines 
used to complete the trip. 
Using the DBlA, Good, Sickles and Weiher (2007) identify the origin and the ultimate 
destination as indicated by a trip break. Approximately 20 percent of trips involve one 
way tickets (no trip breaks), 65 percent are one way (one trip break at the destination), 
and the remaining 5 percent involve open jaw or multi-break tickets. The changing 
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pattern of these tickets is described in Figure 12• For each trip type, we identify the 
complexity of the trip from the DBlA at the ticket level. The travel itinerary allows us to 
measure the number of segments (changes of planes with the same carrier) required in the 
itinerary, the number of airlines that were used to provide service, and the number of 
changes required to a different airline (interlines). For each of these variables the higher 
the variable is, the lower the quality of service. Figure 2 displays the patterns of one way 
trips over the sample period while the patterns of round trip itineraries are shown in 
Figure 3. Their data suggest that there has been some improvement in the quality of 
service between 19781-1992IV. If ignored in the computation of price indices these 
service quality improvements would inflate the rate of growth in prices. 
Good, Sickles and Weiher (2007) believes the more departures that occur (higher flight 
frequency), the more likely that the time of departure will match the most desired time for 
the passenger, indicating a higher level of service. Figure 4 displays the pattern of change 
in departures for different sizes of airports. There was a clear shift from very small to 
larger cities. From the airline's perspective the shift was economical. However, from the 
passenger's perspective, offering service to small communities was desirable since it 
reduced travel time. For Good, Sickles and Weiher (2007)'s study, Departures from small 
communities as an indication of high service quality. Good, Sickles and Weiher (2007) 
2 Figure I to Figure 7 are cited from Good, Sickles and Weiher (2007) 
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use hedonic characteristics to measure passenger amenity: food, and class of service. 
Figure 5 indicates that there has been a gradual increase in food expenditures per 
passenger. Even when one controls for inflation in food prices, they still find 25 percent 
increase in real expenditures per passenger during the sample period, which would 
indicate about 3 percent of the price of travel, on average, could be attributed to food 
expense. 
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Figure 1. Fraction of One Way Tickets Sold 
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Figure 2. Patterns of One Way Itineraries 
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Figure 3. Patterns of Round Trip Itineraries 
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Figure 4. Number of Departures by Airport Size 
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Figure 5. Airline Food Expenditures 
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Figure 6 shows the fraction of all tickets which were discounted coach tickets for one 
way and round trip travel during the sample period. The data show steady increase in 
both one way and round trip tickets that are discounted coach. For round trip tickets, only 
30 percent of tickets were discounted coach in 1979I, increased to nearly 90 percent by 
1992 IV. Frequent flyer miles were introduced in the mid 1980s by then CEO Robert 
Crandall of American Airlines. The purpose of this program was to increase customer 
loyalty by offering them free travel at a later date. The pattern of these tickets can be seen 
in Figure? for one way and round trip travel. For both round trip and one way travel there 
is a spike in 1987 associated with the introduction of these tickets to about 10 percent for 
both one way and round trip travel. Good, Sickles and Weiher (2007) believes that 
several route characteristics clearly affect the price of travel. These characteristics include 
the distance between the origin and destination, mean temperature difference in an 
attempt to capture vacation travel in the winter months, variables which attempt to 
capture the demand for business travel such as the number of white collar jobs in an area. 
In their model, they assume that these factors are either very slow to change or that they 
are strongly correlated with other factors in their model (for example, white collar jobs 
are likely correlated with per capita income). They capture these slowly moving factors 
with fixed route specific effects which describe the origin-destination pair. They also 
considered the use of other factors. These included safety, compliant data, and control for 
local demand characteristics such as growth oflocal GDP and employment rates at origin 
and destination. 
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Figure 6. Fraction of Discounted Coach and First Class Tickets 
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Figure 7. Fraction of One Way and Round Trip Zero Coupon Tickets 
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Good, Sickles and Weiher (2007) simulates Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) current 
methodology over the study period, without the advantage of using their data. And then 
compare these results to price indices which allow for increased substitutability in market 
baskets by using sales information and adjust the price index by holding attributes of 
service quality fixed. The replicated indices match very well with the actual index 
reported by the BLS. Since one way and round trip tickets in terms of both the passenger 
and the airline have key differences. Consequently, they develop separate demand models 
for one way and round trips and discuss these results before combining them in an overall 
aril travel demand model. They first estimate a base model that does not include any 
aspects of service quality: 
For ticket i on route j at time t. Pt is the coefficient on a dummy time variable where 
the reference category is time period 19791. Omitted service quality characteristics may 
be correlated with fixed time and/or route effects, therefore, the OLS estimates of aJs 
and {Jjs may be biased and inconsistent. They use predicted price ratio from 19791 to 
time t. Their hedonic model includes the effects of restriction and service quality 
In Pijt = ai + PtDt + L rtXkiit + Eijt 
k 
Where the Xkiit are the k measures of service quality and ticket discounting for ticket 
i on route j. In this model they control for the expenditures on food, the number of 
departures, the number of segments (more segments indicating a more circuitous trip and 
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required changes of planes), interlining (the requirement that passengers also change 
airlines when they change planes), the class of service (dummy indicating first class) and 
whether or not the ticket has fare restrictions. The corresponding quantity index of tickets 
correspond to the total price of a ticket divided by the imputed quality adjusted price 
index for a flight on a particular route for a particular airline at a point in time. 
DOT's airline data set includes four inputs: labor, energy, flight capital and a residual 
category, materials, that includes supplies, outside services, and non-flight capital. The 
data set includes two outputs: scheduled and non-scheduled revenue passenger-miles. 
Weiher, Sickles and Perloff (2003) constructed quantity and price data using the 
multilateral Tornqvist-Theil index number procedure. They aggregate 93 separate labor 
accounts into five major employment classes (flight deck crews, flight attendants, 
mechanics, passenger/cargo/aircraft handlers, and other personnel). Energy input was 
constructed by combining information on aircraft fuel gallons used with fuel expense data 
per period. They aggregated 69 separate expenditure accounts into 12 broad classes of 
materials or other input that did not fit into the labor, energy, or flight capital categories. 
They constructed the average number of aircraft in service for each quarter by dividing 
the total number of aircraft days for all aircraft types by the number of days in the quarter. 
The measure of flight capital was adjusted by the average equipment size. Weiher, 
Sickles and Perloff (2003) calculated the price per unit (passenger-mile or ton-mile) of 
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the relevant service by dividing the revenue generated in the category by the physical 
amount of output in that category. Passenger load factor is calculated by dividing revenue 
passenger-miles by available seat-mailes. Average stage length is found by dividing total 
revenue aircraft miles flown by total revenue aircraft departure. 
Weiher, Sickles and Perloff (2003) assumes that the individual cost functions are 
Cobb_ Douglas 
In Cost= 
{31 Revenue Passenger Miles+ 
{32 In Enplanements + {33 In Cargo Ton Miles + {34 In Cities + {35 In Load Factor + 
{36 InAverage Stage Length+{37 InLabor Price+f38 Fuel Price+{39Materials Price+ 
{3 In Captial Price+~"!-umber of arilines a· Airline· 10 .L.t=l l l 
Revenue Passenger Miles are the sum of the miles traveled by paying passengers. 
Enplanements are the sum of passengers on all flights. Cargo Ton Miles are the number 
of cargo ton miles per flight. Caves, Christensen, and Tretheway (1984) suggest that 
network size is an important reason why airline costs differ. As the number of cities 
increase, holding number of passenger miles constant, the density of traffic on the 
carriers' network tends to decrease. Load Factor allows us to consider the effects of 
changes in revenue passenger miles, while holding the number of available seat miles 
constant. One would expect that increasing revenue passenger miles while holding 
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available seat miles constant would have a very low cost since it involves simply filling 
up an otherwise empty seat. For a cross-sectional, time series model, Weiher, Sickles and 
Perloff (2003) estimates the scale elasticity is 1.018, which is not statistically different 
from 1 at conventional significance level. Using these estimates, they calculate various 
carrier and time-specific marginal costs for the passenger's flight: 
Terminal costs = M C Enplanements 
Per Mile Cost = MCRevenue Passenger Miles 
Total Segment Cost= MCEnplanements + MCRevenue Passenger Miles X Miles Flown 
After estimating marginal costs, Weiher, Sickles and Perloff (2003) calculate the Total 
Itinerary Cost as 
number of segments 
' MCi,carriert + MCi,carriert D. t L._, Enplanement Revenue Passneger Miles X ZS ancei 
i 
Where i indexes segments and carrieri is the carrier for segment i. 
These variables have been examined in this chapter is in a somewhat different reduced 
form market power setting in Weiher, Sickles, and Perloff (2003) and in the context of 
constructing a hedonic airline price index (Good, Sickles and Weiher 2007). We choose 
two airlines, American (AA) and United (UA) data from Databank lA (DBlA) 
Department of Transportation (DOT) data during period 19791 -1988IV. Some previous 
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studies focus on trips between origin and destination airports. However, doing so neglects 
the competition that airlines face from carriers that fly from different airports within the 
same city. Therefore, we use City-Pairs instead of Airport-Pairs. Among all City-Pairs 
that UA and AA are top two dominant carriers, we choose four City-Pairs to analyze. 
They are Chicago-San Diego, Chicago-Seattle, Chicago-San Francisco and Chicago-Salt 
Lake City. We use estimates of the average cost when route is defined by city pair 
(avcstcty), average price when the route is a city pair (avgprcty), and the number of 
passengers on a route (rtpass) from Perloff et al. (2003). Our results are based on an 
assumed discount factor f3 of 0. 9, but a value of 0.95 was also examined and the 
results were qualitatively similar. In addition, we use national per capita income (pcinc) 
as an economy-wide exogenous variable Xt and Herfindahl index for city pair 
(herfcty) as an city-pair specific exogenous variable Zt which appears to be the best 
city-pair specific exogenous variable we could find in the available data. 
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1.5. Empirical Results 
Estimation results are report d in Tables 1 and 2. The cities are Chicago (ORD), Salt 
Lake City (SLC), San Diego (SAN), San Francisco (SFO), and Seattle (SEA). 
Numerical issues with our algorithm prevented us from estimating accurately the 
standard errors for several of the variables. Those entries are left blank in the Tables 
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Table 1 AA 
City Pair ORD-SAN ORD-SEA ORD-SFO ORD-SLC 
All Estimates 0.64976652 0.34198363 0.35672006 0.00000596 
All SE 0.09058998 0.08449455 0.09268303 0.23502357 
A12 Estimates 0.00000552 0.16309741 0.16265314 0.44189663 
i2 SE ** 0.09752401 0.11300235 0.13558679 
A13 Estimates 0.13236929 0.15559350 0.14523205 ~.24318685 
Al3 SE 0.08278507 0.07760735 0.07974509 ~.19779975 
A 14 Estimates 0.00001244 0.00000927 0.00000201 ~.00000029 
A14 SE 0.05990846 0.04294906 0.04234850 ~.07371905 
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Table2 UA 
City Pair ~RD-SAN ORD-SEA ORD-SFO ORD-SLC 
221 Estimates 0.69631873 0.00034146 0.00017537 0.00000281 
221 SE 0.10723028 0.35834513 ** ** 
222 Estimates 0.00001757 0.30445244 0.29264571 0.45626616 
222 SE 0.19210776 0.11489267 0.09255699 0.12926968 
223 Estimates 0.18620294 0.35685817 0.38122657 0.33791960 
223 SE 0.11633113 0.10459605 ~.08599149 0.04786982 
224 Estimates 0.00000065 0.00000525 0.00000102 0.00001359 
224 SE 0.1357732 0.24650047 0.032894 ** 
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Comparing 213 with 223 in Tables 1 and 2, AA appears to be more significantly 
influenced by the economy-wide exogenous variables than UA since 213 > 223 
Neither AA nor UA is significantly influenced by the city-pair specific variances. 
The shadow value of IS 111 1 112 2 113 1 114 1 d . d" th At qc,t +At qc,t +At xt+1 +At zt+1 an tn tcates e 
f I k h"l 121 1 122 2 123 2 124 2 extent o AA s mar et power w 1 e A 1 qc,t +At qc,t +At xt+1 +At zt+1 is the shadow 
2 
value of qc,t and indicates the market power ofUA. Based on results from Table 1 
and Table 2, we can calculate the market power of AA and UA, at sample mean values of 
the variables. These estimates of q~,t q~,t are in Table 3. 
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Table 3 
City Pair ORD-SAN ORD-SEA ORD-SFO ORD-SLC 
AA 148155.47814 42739.03961 44788.23266 44267.45226 
~A 69711.50634 25440.61308 30158.55228 33775.10931 
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Translating these estimates into market power shares of AA and UA in four city pairs is 
demonstrated in Table 4. 
q2 
Market Power/%= 1 c 2 qc + qc 
q1 
Marekt Powerl% = 1 c 2 qc + qc 
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Table 4 Market Power Share of AA and UA in city pairs 
City Pair ORD-SAN ORD-SEA ORD-SFO ORD-SLC 
UA ~1% 63% 60% 57% 
AA 59% 37% 40% 43% 
60 
ORO-SAN 
61 
- ---- ----·---
ORO-SEA 
62 
ORD-SFO 
63 
ORD-SLC 
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From Table 4 UA has a relatively larger market power share in ORD-SEA,ORD-SFO and 
ORD-SLC compared with AA, especially in ORD-SEA, while UA's market power is 
63%. In city-pair ORD-SAN, AA has a relatively larger market power which is 59%. 
We know that when there are only a few agents on one side of a market, for these agents 
will possess market power and the bigger the market power share, the higher profit it will 
have, holding other factors constant. One would expect, therefore, that AA would be 
more profitable in the ORD-SAN market while UA would be more profitable in the other 
three city pairs. 
This chapter has developed a dynamic model of collusion in airport-pair routes airlines 
and compares the market power between the city-pairs Chicago and San Diego, Chicago 
and Seattle, Chicago and San Francisco and Chicago and Salt Lake City for United 
Airlines and American Airlines. We have used a state-space representation that is 
estimated by Kalman-filtering techniques to specify the first order conditions. The data 
we use are Databank lA (DBlA) Department of Transportation (DOT) data. In our 
model, we discuss the economy-wide exogenous variables and city-pair specific 
variables. 
In this chapter, we only look at all the city pairs in which American and United are 
dominant firms. In future work, we can extend the chapter to examine richer empirical 
settings in which, among other things, the city-pair routes are not dominated by two firms 
and in which exit-entry is impacted by firm conduct and market conditions. Our general 
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framework also appears to be an appropriate and feasible vehicle for examining market 
conduct in other industries where merger and acquisition activities may be subject to FTC 
or US department of Justice oversight. 
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CHAPTER23 
Airline Energy Demand 
2.1. Introduction 
The U.S. commercial airline industry consumes 4% of the fuel used in the U.S. and 
understanding what influences the demand for fuel and how to best forecast the airline 
industry's future energy demands has import to the carriers themselves, for planning and 
operational decision, but also for world energy markets. Before we focus on a particular 
facet of energy demand, aircraft jet fuel, we provide a bit of perspective on energy 
demand (and supply) from an economic point of view. The general issues of what factors 
drive energy demand, the economics of energy commodities, and the need to have better 
energy forecasting systems are all important factors in a world where the environmental 
impacts of global warming are beginning to be acknowledged. This last issues is all the 
more relevant to the airline industry in light of the recent decision by the European Union 
to include aviation emissions in its C02 cap and trade program (Wall Street Journal, June 
6, 2011) "EU Holds Ground on Airline C02 Cap; Trade War Coming?"). In this plan not 
only will European (EU) airlines be given C02 limits and will pay penalties of 
EURlOO/ton for C02 emissions above their allotment, but the limits will also be binding 
3 Chapter 2 is partially based on Fang, Y, Sickles, R.C. (2008b) 
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on US airlines who have European operations. Clearly such a program, and any others 
that require counterfactual analysis of energy demand, specifically aircraft jet fuel 
demand, can only be analyzed on the basis of a structural model, such as the one we have 
developed in the previous chapter. 
The study of the economics of energy resources and energy commodities includes the 
factors and forces motivating firms and consumers to supply, convert, transport, use 
energy resource; market and regulatory structures; distributional and environmental 
consequences; economically efficient use. Energy demand is derived from preferences for 
energy services to both industry and the household and depends on properties of 
conversion technologies and costs. The fact that energy use is dominantly depletable 
resources, particularly fossil fuels, makes this chapter unique. The energy industry has 
moved into the 21st century with promises of both profits and a short-term future. 
Exploration and production technology is constantly improving, creating the ability to 
find oil and gas in increasingly remote and inaccessible locations. With added pressure 
from government, cleaner fuels are being introduced on a continual basis. Additionally, 
the expanding energy demand from developing countries is changing the energy market. 
From December 1 through 11, 1997, more than 160 nations met in Kyoto, Japan, to 
negotiate binding limitations on greenhouse gases for the developed nations, pursuant to 
the objectives of the Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992. The outcome of 
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the meeting was the Kyoto Protocol, in which the developed nations agreed to limit their 
greenhouse gas emissions, relative to the levels emitted in 1990. The United States agreed 
to reduce emissions from 1990 levels by 7% during the period 2008 to 2012. 
Energy is crucial to the economic progress and social development of nations. Energy can 
be neither created nor destroyed but can be converted among forms. Energy comes from 
the physical environment and ultimately returns there. The demand for energy is a 
derived demand. The value of energy is assessed by its ability to provide a set of desired 
services in both industry and in the household. 
Energy commodities are economic substitutes. Energy resources are depletable or 
renewable and storable or non-storable. On a global scale the 20th century was dominated 
by the use of fossil fuels. According to the US department of Energy, in the year 2000 
global commercial energy consumption consisted of Petroleum (39%), coal (24%), 
natural gas (23%), hydro (6%), nuclear (7%) and others (1 %). In 1999, the total sources 
of energy consumed in the United States, 92% was from a depletable resource and only 8% 
was from a renewable resource. No one doubts that fossil fuels are subject to depletion, 
and that depletion leads to scarcity, which in turn leads to higher prices. Resources are 
defined as "nonconventional" when they cannot be produced economically at today's 
prices and with today's technology. With higher prices, however, the gap between 
conventional and nonconventional oil resources narrows. Ultimately, a combination of 
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escalating prices and technological enhancements can transform the nonconventional into 
conventional. Much of the pessimism about oil resources has been focused entirely on 
conventional resources. 
Demand for Energy 
Energy security refers to loss of economic welfare that may occur as a result of a change 
in the price of availability of energy. Bohi and Toman (1996) suggest a link between 
energy and economy. An abundance of empirical research supports that a strong correlation 
between increases in oil prices and decreases in macroeconomic performance for 
oil-importing industrialized countries. 
Industrial energy demand increases most rapidly at the initial stages of development, but 
growth slows steadily throughout the industrialization process (Medlock and Soligo, 
2001). Energy demand for transportation rises steadily, and takes the majority share of 
total energy use at the latter stages of developments. 
In fact, almost every recession in the post-World War II era in the United States, as well as 
many other energy-importing nations, has been preceded by a spike to the price of energy 
(Hamilton, 1983, Ferderer, 1996 and Mork, Mysen, and Olsen, 1994) 
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Strong economic growths across the globe and new global demands for more energy have 
meant the end of sustained surplus capacity in hydrocarbon fuels and the beginning of 
capacity limitations. In fact, the world is currently precariously close to utilizing all of its 
available oil-production capacity, raising the chances of an oil-supply crisis with more 
substantial consequences then seen in three decades. These limits mean that America can 
no longer assume that oil-producing states will provide more oil. Nor is it strategically and 
politically desirable to remedy our present tenuous situation by simply increasing our 
dependence on a few foreign sources. As a result, the expanding demand for energy will 
change U.S. policy toward the Middle East, Russia and China. A recent example is that the 
state-owned Chinese company CNOOC eventually abandons Unocal bid due to strong 
political opposition in the US. 
Elasticity of energy demand 
Is Energy an essential good? In economics, an essential good is one for which the 
demand remains positive no matter how high its price becomes. Energy is often described 
as an essential good because human activity would be impossible absent use of energy. 
Energy is essential to humans, neither particular energy commodities nor any purchased 
energy commodities are essential goods because consumers can convert one form of 
energy into another. 
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The income elasticity of energy demand is defined as the percentage change in energy 
demand given a one percent change in income holding all else constant, or 
%~e de y 
s =--=-·-
y %~y dy e 
where e denotes energy demand and y denotes income. "The household sector's share 
of aggregate energy consumption tends to fall with income, the share of transportation 
tends to rise, and the share of industry follows an inverse-U pattern." (Judson, 
Schmalensee and Stroker, 1999) 
The price elasticity of energy demand is defined as the percentage change in energy 
demand given a one percent change in price holding all else constant, or 
%~e de p 
s =--=-·-
p %~ dp e 
where p denotes the price of energy. 
Cooper (2003) uses a multiple regression model derived from an adaptation ofNerlove's 
partial adjustment model to estimate both the short-run and long-run elasticity of demand 
for crude oil in 23 countries. The estimates so obtained confirm that the demand for crude 
oil internationally is highly insensitive to changes in price. 
Demand Substitution Between Energy Commodities and others 
Denny, Fuss, and Waverman (1981) used time-series data for 18 U.S. manufacturing two 
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digit industries (1948-71) and 18 Canadian manufacturing industry groups (1962-75). 
Their results were also mixed: for both U.S. and Canada, energy and capital were 
substitutes in the food industry, but they were complements in the tobacco industry. 
Energy consumption can be modeled as either providing utility to households or as an 
input in the production process for firms. Expressing the former problem mathematically, 
we have that a representative consumer maximizes utility, U(z,e), which is function of 
energy consumption, e, and all other consumption, z , subject to the constraint that 
expenditures cannot exceed income, y. Let the energy variable be a vector of nenergy 
products, e = (epe2 , ••• ,en), we could examine the substitution possibilities across energy 
products. Allowing the price of good j to be represented as p j , the consumer is 
assumed to 
max U(z,ep ... en) 
z,e1, ••• e, 
The first order necessary conditions for a maximum for this problem can be solved to 
yield demand equations for each of the energy products and for all other consumption. 
With some adjustments, the above method can be applied to a representative firm. 
Recent research focuses mainly on dynamic models. Dynamic models allow for a more 
complete analysis of the energy demand because they are capable of capturing factors 
that generate the asymmetries. In addition, dynamic models incorporate the intertemporal 
choices that a consumer/firm must make when maximizing utilities/profits over some 
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time horizon. Medlock and Soligo (2002) developed a useful framework. Let z1 be 
multiple types of capital and e1 be multiple types of energy consumption. Denoting time 
using the subscript t the consumer will maximize the discounted sum of lifetime utility, 
T 
I: fi 1U(zt'e1 ), subject to the constraint capital goods purchases (i1 ), purchases of other 
t=O 
goods ( Z1 ), purchases of energy ( e1 ), and savings ( s1 ) in each period cannot exceed this 
period's income (y1 ), plus the return of last period's saving ((l+r)st-t). It is assumed 
that capital goods depreciate at a rate 8, savings earn a rate return r, the discount rate is 
0 < p < 1, and all initial conditions are given. 
Consumers will 
T 
max I: P1U(z1 ,ee) 
z,e,s t=O 
World Energy Demand Outlook 
According to EIA, world energy consumption is projected to increase by 57% from 2002 to 
2025. World oil use is expected to grow from 78 million barrels per day in 2002 to 103 
million barrels per day in 2015 and 119 million barrels per day in 2025. The projected 
increment in worldwide oil use would require an increment in world oil production 
capacity of 42 million barrels per day over 2002 levels. Members of the OPEC are 
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expected to be the major suppliers of the increased production that will be required to meet 
demand, and they account for 60% of the projected increase in world capacity. In addition, 
non-OPEC suppliers are expected to add nearly 17 million barrels per day of oil production 
capacity between 2002 and 2025. Substantial increments in new non-OPEC supply are 
expected to come from the Caspian Basin, Western Africa, and Central and South America. 
Natural gas is projected to be the fastest growing component of world primary energy 
consumption. Consumption of natural gas worldwide increases in the forecast by an 
average of2.3% annually from 2002 to 2025, compared with projected annAAl growth rate 
of 1.9% for oil consumption and 2.0% for coal consumption. From 2002 to 2025, 
consumption of natural gas is projected to increase by 69%, and its share of total energy 
consumption is projected to grow from 23% to 25%. Natural gas is seen as a desirable 
alternative for electricity generation in many parts of the world, given its relatively 
efficiency in comparison with other energy sources, as well as the fact that it bums more 
cleanly than either coal or oil and thus is an attractive alternative for countries pursuing 
reductions in greenhouse gas emission. 
World coal consumption is projected to increase at an average rate of2.5% per year. From 
2015 to 2025, the projected rate of increase in world coal consumption slows to 1.3% 
annually. Coal is expected to maintain its importance as an energy source in both the 
electric power and industrial sectors. 
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Hydroelectricity and other renewable energy sources are expected to maintain 8% share of 
total energy use worldwide throughout the projection period. Much of the projected growth 
in renewable electricity generation is expected to result from the completion of large 
hydroelectric facilities in emerging economies, particularly in Asia. 
Energy Supply 
The study of depletable resource economics began with articles by L. Grey (1914) and H. 
Hotelling (1931 ), which examined economically inter-temporal optimal extraction from a 
perfectly known stock of the resource, with perfectly predictable future prices of the 
extracted commodity. Sweeney (1977) and Stiglitz (1976) both clarified the Hotelling 
rule in the presence of monopoly, and Gilbert and Richard (1978) and Salant (1976) 
extended this to the case of a dominant producer with a competitive fringe and several 
dominant producers, analogous to the case of OPEC. Pindyck (1982) and Kolstad (1994) 
extended the model to several imperfectly substitutable exhaustible resources. 
In the years following the 1973 oil price rise, U.S. energy policy could be characterized 
as generally suspicious of the market. Supply augmentation was a major strategy pursued 
by the U.S. government in addressing the "energy crisis." The security dimensions of 
energy supply have always been viewed as appropriate concerns of the government. One 
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could argue that the Gulf War in the early 1990s was simply a form of energy policy, 
protecting western oil supplies originating in the Middle East. Countries other than the 
United States (such as Japan, China) have tried to diversify their sources of energy to 
reduce the risk of disruption. 
Security was also viewed as threatened by sudden fluctuations in the price of oil: thus the 
establishment of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). The idea is that if the price of oil 
were to rise rapidly due to disruption in supply, then the SPR could be called upon to 
provide supplies, thus reducing the price shock. 
But depletable resource use cannot dominate forever. Therefore, a future transition from 
depletable resources, particularly from fossil fuels, is inevitable. However, which 
renewable energy sources will dominate future consumption is unclear. And there is great 
uncertainty about the timing of a shift to renewable energy resources. Although this is a 
formidable question, Wiser, R., Olson, S., Bird, L., and Swezey, B. (2004) introduce 
green pricing programs, which represent one way that consumers can voluntarily support 
renewable energy. Their analysis yields several interesting results: Program duration 
impacts customer response. The longer a program has been operating, the more likely its 
message has spread and the higher the probability of strong program success. Higher 
purchase thresholds for residential customers should be considered. Initial customer 
participants in green pricing programs may not be highly sensitive to cost, and may be 
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willing to purchase higher quantities of renewable energy. Therefore, this is the case for 
those utilities focused on maximizing renewable energy sales, not customer participation 
rates. Price premiums and minimum monthly costs are not the primary determinants of 
program success. Price may become a more important determinant as green pricing 
programs expand to target more than the early innovator customers. And smaller utilities 
appear to have a greater likelihood of achieving success. 
The prospect of producing clean, sustainable power in substantial quantities from 
renewable energy sources is arousing renewed interest worldwide. Hydroelectricity is the 
only renewable energy source today that makes a large contribution to world energy 
production. The long-term technical potential is believed to be 9 to 12 times current 
production, but increasingly, environmental concerns block new dams. The large areas 
affected may have a negative environment impact. Hydroelectricity dams, like the Aswan 
Dam, have adverse consequences both upstream and downstream. Wind power is one of 
the most cost competitive renewable sources today. Its long-term technical potential is 
believed 5 times current global energy consumption. But this requires 12.7% of all land 
area with certain height. Geothermal power and tidal power are the only renewable 
sources not dependent on the sun but are today limited to special locations. Most 
renewable sources are diffuse and require large land areas and great quantities of 
construction material for significant energy production. There is some doubt that they can 
be built out rapidly enough to replace fossil fuels. The large and sometimes remote 
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areas may also increase energy loss and cost from distribution. On the other hand, some 
forms allow small-scale production and may be placed very close to or directly at 
consumer households, businesses, and industries. We may forecast the coexistence of 
multi-renewable energy sources in the future. Boyle (1996) provides a comprehensive 
overview of the principal renewable energy sources: solar thermal, biomass, tidal, wave, 
photovoltaic, hydro, wind, and geothermal. 
World Oil Market 
The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) comprises countries that 
have organized for the purpose of negotiating with oil companies on matters of Petroleum 
production, prices, and future concession rights. Founded September 14, 1960 at a 
Baghdad conference, OPEC originally consisted of only five countries: Iran; Iraq, Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, but has since expanded to include several others: Algeria, 
Indonesia, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates. The members of OPEC, 
which constitute a cartel, agree on the quantity and the prices of the oil exported. OPEC 
seeks to regulate oil production, and thereby manage oil prices, primarily by setting 
quotas for its members. Member countries hold about 75% of the world's oil reserves, 
and supply 40% of the world's oil. Since worldwide oil sales are dominated in U.S. 
dollars, changes in the value of the dollar against other world currencies affect OPEC's 
decisions on how much oil to produce. After the introduction of the eruo, Iraq unilaterally 
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decided it wanted to be paid for its oil in euros instead of U.S. dollars. OPEC decisions 
have a heavy influence on international oil prices. A good example is 1973 energy crisis, 
in which OPEC refused to ship oil to western countries that had supported Israel its 
conflict with Egypt, the Yom Kippur War. This refusal caused a fourfold increase in oil 
price, which lasted five months, starting on October 17, 1973, and ending on March 18, 
1974. OPEC nations then agreed on January 7, 1975, to raise crude oil prices by 10%. 
Unlike many other cartels, OPEC has been successful at increasing the price of oil for 
extended periods. Much of OPEC's success can be attributed to Saudi Arabia's flexibility. 
It has tolerated cheating on the part of other cartel members, and cut its own production 
to compensate for other members have exceeded their production quotas. This actually 
gives them good leverage, because with most members at full production, Saudi Arabia is 
the only member with spare capacity, and the ability to increase supply, if needed. The 
policy has been successful. However, OPEC's ability to raise prices does have some 
limits. An increase in oil price decreases consumption, and could cause a net decrease in 
revenue. Furthermore, an extended rise in price could encourage systematic behavior 
change, such as alternative energy utilization, or increased conservation. As of August 
2004, OPEC has been communicating that its members have little excess pumping 
capacity, indicating that the cartel is losing influence over crude oil prices. 
The six major non-OPEC oil-producing nations are: Norway, Russia, Canada, Mexico, 
the United States and Oman. Russian production increases dominated no-OPEC 
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production growth from 2000 forward and was responsible for most of the non-OPEC 
increases since the turn of the century. In 2001, a weakening U.S. economy and increases 
in non-OPEC production put downward pressure on prices. In response OPEC once again 
entered into a series of reductions in member quotas cutting 3.5 million barrels by 
September 1, 2001. In the absence ofthe September 11, 2001 terrorist attack this would 
have been sufficient to moderate or even reverse the trend. In the wake of the attack the 
crude oil price plummeted. Under normal circumstances a drop in price of this magnitude 
would have resulted in another round of quota reductions but given the political climate 
OPEC delayed additional cuts until January 2002 when it reduced its quota by 1.5 million 
barrels per day and was joined by several non-OPEC producers including Russia who 
promised combined production cuts of an additional 462,500 barrels. This had the desired 
effect with oil prices moving into the $25 range by March 2002. By mid-year the 
non-OPEC members were restoring their production cuts but prices continue to rise and 
U.S. inventories reached a 20-year low later in the year. By yearend oversupply was not a 
problem. Problems in Venezuela lead to a strike at PDVSA causing Venezuelan 
production to plummet. In the wake of the strike Venezuela was never able to restore 
capacity to its previous level and is still about 900,000 barrels per day below its peak 
capacity of 3.5 million barrels per day. On March 19, 2003, just as some Venezuelan 
production was beginning to return, military action commenced in Iraq. Meanwhile, 
inventories remained low in the U.S. and other OECD countries. With an improving 
economy U.S. demand was increasing and Asian demand for crude oil was growing at a 
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rapid pace. The loss of production capacity in Iraq and Venezuela combined with 
increased production to meet growing international demand led to the erosion of excess 
oil production capacity, but by mid 2003 the excess was below 2 million. During much of 
2004 and 2005 the spare capacity to produce oil has been less than one million barrels per 
day. A million barrel per day is not enough spare capacity to cover an interruption of 
supply from almost any OPEC producer. In a world that consumes over 80 million barrels 
per day of petroleum products that add a significant risk premium to crude oil price and is 
largely responsible for prices in excess of $40 per barrel. Readers who are interested in 
The History of World Oil Market and Prices: 1970-2004 could find more material from 
(EIA). 
Energy, Economy and Environment 
Many important environment damages stem from the production, conversion, and 
consumption of energy. Costs of these environmental damages generally are not 
incorporated into prices for energy commodities and resources; this omission leads to 
overuse of energy. It has been shown that estimates of damage costs resulting from 
combustion of fossil fuels, if internalized into the price of the resulting output of 
electricity, could clearly lead to a number of renewable technologies being financially 
competitive with generation from coal plants. Environmental impacts currently receiving 
most attention are associated with the release of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, 
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primarily carbon dioxide, from combustion of fossil fuels. During combustion, carbon 
combines with oxygen to produce carbon dioxide, the primary greenhouse gas. Carbon 
dioxide accumulates in the atmosphere and is expected to result in significant detrimental 
impacts on the world's climate, including global warming, rises in the ocean levels, 
increased intensity of tropical storms, and losses in biodiversity. Concern about this issue 
is common to energy economics, environmental economics, and ecological economics. 
Cropper and Oates (1992) suggest a treatment of measuring benefits and costs with a 
review of cases where benefit-cost analyses have actually been used in the setting of 
environmental standards. Owen (2004) suggests penalizing high pollutant emitting 
technologies not only creates incentives for "new" technologies, but it also encourages 
the adoption of energy efficiency measures with existing technologies and consequently 
lowers pollutants per unit of output. 
Over the past several decades, rising concentrations of greenhouse gases have been 
detected in the Earth's atmosphere. It has been hypothesized that the continued 
accumulation of greenhouse gases could lead to an increase in the average temperature of 
the Earth's surface and cause a variety of changes in the global climates, see level, 
agricultural patterns, and ecosystems that could be, on net, detrimental. 
World carbon dioxide emissions are expected to increase by 1.9% annually between 2001 
and 2025. Much of the increase in these emissions is expected to occur in the developing 
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countries. The U.S. produces about 25% of global carbon dioxide emissions from burning 
fossil fuels, primarily because of its largest economy in the world and 85% of its energy 
needs through burning fossil fuels. The U.S. is projected to lower its carbon intensity by 
25% from 2001 to 2025. There are numerous proposals aiming at reducing the carbon 
dioxide emissions. Kyoto Protocol is a famous and influential one. Some current 
estimates indicate that if successfully and completely implemented, the Kyoto Protocol is 
predicted to reduce the average global rise in temperature by somewhere between 0.02 
centigrade and 0.28 centigrade by the year 2050. (Source: Nature, October 2003), 
compared to the increase of 1.4 centigrade to 5.8 centigrade between 1990 and 2100 
predicted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 
Sickles and Jeon (2004) evaluate the role that undesirable outputs of the economy, such 
as carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, have on the frontier production process. 
This chapter also explores implications for growth of total factor productivity in the 
OECD and Asian economies. 
Natural disasters shock the energy market, too. According to the Minerals Management 
Service (MMS), Gulf of Mexico daily oil production was reduced by 89% as a result of 
Hurricane Katrina. The MMS also report 72% of daily Gulf of Mexico natural gas 
production was shut in. In 2004, hurricane Ivan causes lasting damage to the energy 
infrastructure in the Gulf of Mexico and interrupts oil and supplies to the United States. 
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U.S. Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham agrees to release 1. 7 million barrels of oil in 
the form of a loan from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. 
2010 BP Deepwater Horizon disaster happened, which eventually dumped five million 
barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico. This had a huge affect on the environment and the 
damage is still being assessed. This largest accidental marine oil spill in the history of 
the oil industry results in a speed up demand on clean oil, which might reshape the 
energy demand scope in the following decades. 
The world runs on energy, primarily energy generated from coal and petroleum. The war 
against terrorism and the tensions in the Middle East have raised new questions about the 
reliability of America's oil supply from that region. Also concerns about global climate 
change have focused increased attention on the search for cleaner fuels and 
energy-generating methods. Russia's determination to become a major petroleum supplier, 
OPEC's periodic moves to restrict oil production and the rising energy needs in China 
and other developing countries. These are all important issues forming the future World 
Energy Market. 
2.2. Airline Energy Demand Forecasts 
Most aviation fuels are jet fuels originating from crude oil. Crude oil must be refined to 
be useful and jet fuel is only one of many products that can be derived from crude oil. Jet 
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fuel is extracted from the middle distillates fraction and competes, for example, with the 
production of diesel. 
Crude oil is a limited natural resource subject to depletion and several reports indicate 
that the world's crude oil production is close to the maximum level and that it will start to 
decrease after reaching this maximum. A post Kyoto political agenda to reduce oil 
consumption will have the same effect on aviation fuel production as a natural decline in 
the crude oil production. On the other hand, it is predicted by the aviation industry that 
aviation traffic will keep on increasing. 
Air traffic has been increasing by mean annual growth rates comprised between 5% and 6% 
since the middle of the 1980s. This growth is supposed to continue in the coming decade. 
In a scare energy resources environment, this strong and rapid growth of air transport 
may be problematic (IPCC, 1999, 2007a, 2007b), which leads to an increased interest for 
policy makers. Cheze, B. et al. (2011) shows that energy efficiency improvements allow 
reducing the effect of air traffic rise on the increase in jet fuel demand, but do not 
annihilate it. Jet fuel demand is thus unlikely to diminish unless there is a radical 
technological shift, or air travel demand is restricted. 
Today global oil production is roughly 81.5 million barrels per day. There are many 
different methodologies for predicting future crude oil production, all relying on different 
assumptions and ideas (Bentley and Boyle, 2007). Some are more optimistic when it 
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comes to the amount that can be produced than others. Oil production forecasts from 
IEA(2008a), Aleklett and Campbell (2003) and Robelius (2007) are taken as 
representative scenarios for future oil production. The aviation fuel part of crude oil 
production is assumed to be a fixed percentage in each scenario. 
Jet fuel demand and aviation traffic growth are not strictly correlated, since the efficiency 
of aircraft and air traffic management are improving. The aviation industry actually has 
experience a huge development since the first commercial aircraft in service. Sicne the 
1960s aircraft are 75% quieter and have reduced fuel consumption by 70%. 
Overviews of different forecasting methods have been done previously (Bentley and 
Boyle, 2007; Brandt, 2007; Carlson, 2007), and all of the models have their strengths and 
weaknesses. Bentley and Boyle concluded that the group of models that predict the peak 
in crude oil production before 2020 are the most realistic. 
The most well known scenario for future oil production is delivered by International 
Energy Agency (lEA) in its yearly publication World Energy Outlook (WEO). This 
scenario is based on a growing global economy and that growth needs more oil. In WEO 
2008 (lEA 2008a) the increase in oil use till 2030 is divided between 1.3 percent for 2009 
to 2020 and then 1.0 percent to the end of the period. The next step is to find production 
to fulfill demand. This "Business as Usual" (BAU) is called Alternative 1. Alternative 2 is 
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a depletion model, called the "Campbell depletion model". The model and the results can 
be found in Campbell (2008). Alternative 3, crude oil production forecast from the 
"Uppsala giant field model" (Robelius, 2007) 
In the second chapter of the dissertation, we focus on the use of our structural model for 
purposes of forecasting energy demands. Energy demands for commercial airlines have 
been addressed by Greene (1992), Faquih (2008) and etc. but none have used a structural 
model as ours. 
2.3. Data 
We use Databank 1A (DB1A) Department of Transportation (DOT) quarterly data during 
the period 1979I -1988IV ( 40 quarters) with a set consisting of 2 airlines with subscripts 
described by their tow letter ticket codes: American (AA) and United (UA). We select 
four city-pairs that American (AA) and United (UA) are dominant players. The four city 
pairs are described by their three letter Airport Codes: Chicago O'hare International 
(ORD)-San Diego International Airport {SAN), Chicago O'hare International 
(ORD)-Seattle-Tacoma International (SEA), San Francisco International (SFO) and 
Chicago O'hare International (ORD)-Salt Lake City International (SLC). The variables 
we used to estimate the structural model are average cost when the route is defined by the 
city pair (avcstcty), average price when the route is a city pair (avgprcty), and the number 
of passengers on a route (rtpass). We use national per capita income (pcinc) as an 
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economy-wide exogenous variable and Herfindahl index for city pair (herfcty) as a 
city-pair specific exogenous variable. We use Gauss as our statistical tool to estimate the 
structural market power model. For Airline Energy Demand, we tried three approaches. 
First, Trendline: we simply use time (t) as a variable. Second, Structural model: we use 
GDP and Oil Price data from Bureau of Economic Analysis and U.S. Energy Information 
respectively. We also control for seasonal factors by including dummy variables for the 
first, second and third quarters of each year. The inputs are the number of passengers on a 
route (rtpass) and Energy Price. Third, ARIMA: we used lags of energy demand and lags 
of the errors as independent variables. 
We use data from 1980-I to 1988-IV as baseline to predict the energy forecast from 
1989-1 to 1994-111. Three types of energy forecasts: Trend line, Structural model and 
ARIMA are compared to actual. 
First, let's look at trend lines. Trend lines are graphical representations of trends in 
data that you can use to analyze problems of predictions. Such analysis is also called 
regression analysis. By using regression analysis, we can extend a trend line in a chart 
beyond the actual data to predict future values. A linear trend line is a best-fit straight line 
that is used with simple linear data sets. Your data is linear if the pattern in its data points 
resembles a line. A linear trend line usually shows that something is increasing or 
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decreasing at a steady rate. 
ft= forecast for time t 
a = intercept of the line 
b = the slope of the line 
n = # of observations 
ft =a+ bt 
LXt- bIt 
a=-----
n 
b = n:L(tXt)- LtLXt 
nit2 - Cit) 2 
Although trend line projects energy demand in a trend manner, most of time we 
would like the forecast reflects seasonal impact, as well as GDP and Oil Price. Here 
introduces a method of structural forecast model that not only will take all into 
consideration but also apply our market power chapter's findings from the first chapter. 
ORD-SLC 
43% 
57% 
From chapter 1, we know that UA has 57% market power in ORD-SLC market 
while AA has 43% market power, which is applied to the number of passengers on the 
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route (rtpass) forecast. We first use Linear Regression to estimate the coefficients, and 
then use the market power share chapter's research findings to predict the number of 
passengers on the route from 1989-1 to 1994-111. GDP, Oil Price and quarterly dummies 
are also included in Structural Model to better track the energy demand pattern. The 
structural energy forecast model is as below. 
ft =a+ fh * rtpass + {32 *Energy Price+ {33 * GDP + {34 *Oil Price+ {35 
* Q2 Dummy + {36 * Q3 Dummy + {37 * Q4 Dummy 
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Table 2.3 .2 AA ORD SLC 
- -
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.922402952 
R Square 0.850827207 
Adjusted R Square 0.813534008 
Standard Error 3712870.18 
Obser.ations 36 
ANOVA 
df ss MS F Significance F 
Regression 
Residual 
7 2.20155E+15 3.14508E+14 22.81454109 5.49082E-10 
28 3.85991E+14 1.37854E+13 
Total 35 2.58755E+15 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Low:r95% Upper 95% Lo~~.er 95. 0% Upper 95. 0% 
Intercept 24088207.85 13356735.24 1.803450276 0.082088862 -3271823.644 51448239.35 -3271823.644 51448239.35 
X Variable 1 -46.06508692 42.89470491 -1.073910801 0.292030748 -133.9309056 41.80073179 -133.9309056 41.80073179 
X Variable 2 -2949108.33 2066354.127 -1.427203736 0.164578907 -7181842.826 1283626.166 -7181842.826 1283626.166 
X Variable 3 6413.364012 1767.599911 3.628289396 0.001127436 2792.599779 10034.12824 2792.599779 10034.12824 
X Variable 4 105620.5997 188746.2963 0.559590317 0.580208229 -281008.6564 492249.8558 -281008.6564 492249.8558 
X Variable 5 1164252.001 1938580.201 0.600569427 0.552957432 -2806749.476 5135253.477 -2806749.476 5135253.477 
X Variable 6 2256634.198 2094712.456 1.077300224 0.290540615 -2034189.701 6547458.096 -2034189.701 6547458.096 
X Variable 7 590988.5944 1809849.234 0.326540235 0.746444022 -3116319.453 4298296.642 -3116319.453 4298296.642 
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We use data of 1980-Ito 1988-IV and ARIMA (1,0,1) to estimate fl., qJ and 8. 
ft = fl. + ft-1 - Bet-1 
And then use average of forecasts from Trend line and structural model to get ft- 1 and 
to do energy predication from 1989-I to 1994-III. 
Chart 2.3.3 and Chart 2.3.4 display AA and UA ORD-SEA Energy Demand Forecasts 
using Trend line, ARIMA and Structural model. 
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Chart 2.3.3 
AA ORO-SEA Energy Demand from 
Q1 1980- Q3 1994 
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For AA ORD-SEA, Structural Model shows significant advantage in prediction of 
turning points and seasonality in these three exercises of forecasts. Trend Line does a 
good job in predicting the trend. ARIMA underestimate the demand. Therefore, in 
AA-SEA, our Structural Model forecast beats the other two approaches. 
But when we look at the other carrier, UA same market ORD-SEA, ARIMA performs the 
best among the three exercises. 
Chart 2.3.5 to Chart 2.3.10 display 95% confidence intervals of AA and UA ORD-SEA 
Energy Demand Forecast using Trend line, ARIMA and Structural model. 
For AA, the majority actual energy demand falls in 95% confidence interval of Structural 
Model. For UA, the majority actual energy demand falls in 95% confidence interval of 
ARIMA. 
None of these three exercises is a dominant winner. Given this circumstance, the use of 
model averaging and forecast combination is a better alternative. We will discuss more in 
chapter 3. 
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Chart 2.3.5 
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Chart 2.3.6 
AA ORO-SEA Energy Demand from 
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Chart 2.3.7 
AA ORO-SEA Energy Demand from 
Q1 1989- Q3 1994 
-+- Actual AA_EQ 
--Structural Model 
..,._95% Confidence Interval low 
~95% Confidence Interval high 
120000000 .-----=============="::====--------, 
20000000 +-----------------------------------------------------~ 
100 
90000000 
80000000 
70000000 
90000000 
... 
':;: 
c: 
~000000 
0 
~000000 
Q) 
c: 
~000000 
20000000 
10000000 
0 
Chart 2.3.8 
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Chart 2.3 .9 
UA ORO-SEA Energy Demand from 
Q1 1989- Q3 1994 
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Chart 2.3.10 
UA ORO-SEA Energy Demand from 
Q1 1989- Q3 1994 
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CHAPTER3 
The Use of Model Averaging and Forecast Combination 
Techniques in Estimating Jet and Fuel Demand 
3.1. Introduction 
In Chapter 3, we discuss and utilize various forecasting approaches that combined 
forecasts using various weighting schemes and we utilize these as well as specific 
forecast from our structure model, ARIMA time series and simple time trends. A 
combined estimations or forecasts provide a decisive conclusion instead of a confusion of 
diversified results. From an academic view, combining estimates, or averaging estimates 
is certainly a way of providing a solution to modeling uncertainty. 
In model selection the data are used to select one of the models under consideration. An 
alternative to selecting one model and basing all future work on this one model is model 
averaging. This means estimating the quantity in question via a number of possible 
models, and forming a weighted average of the resulting estimators. 
Bayesian model averaging computes posterior probabilities for each of the models and 
uses those probabilities as weights. Bayesian model averaging has been literally hundreds 
of journal papers over the past decade or so; see e.g. Draper (1995), Hoeting et al. (1999), 
Clyde (1999), Clyde and George (2004). The literature has mostly been concerned with 
104 
------- - --------------
issues of interpretation and computation. Results about the large-sample behavior of 
Bayesian model-averaging schemes were found in Hjort and Claeskens (2003). 
In this case, combining separate forecasts can improve forecasts. The concept and 
methodology of forecast combination were introduced by Bates and Granger (1969) in a 
seminal paper that has become a citation classic. Surveys and Discussions of some 
subsequent developments and applications by Clemen (1989), Granger (1989), and 
Diebold and Lopez (1996) testify to the wide spread interest that has developed in the 
topic. Newbold and Harvey (2002), Bates and Granger (1969) recommended that 
researchers should consider creating a combined forecast, possibly a weighted average of 
the individual forecast, when alternative forecasts are available. Granger and Ramanathan 
(1984) suggest the use of linear regressions to compute optimal combination weights; 
Diebold and Pauly (1990) propose a least squares weighted average and equal weighted 
combination, giving the methods Bayesian interpretations; and Stock and Watson (2004) 
suggest a factor model to extract the common forecast from a set of forecasts. But most 
studies still find that in majority of circumstances, simple methods like the equal weight 
averaging still performs as well as or even better than more sophisticated methods 
derived optimally using the variance-covariance structure of a set of historical forecast 
errors, see for example, Genre, Kenny, Meyler and Timmermann (2010). One endemic 
problem that has attracted little attention is the fact that many forecast data are 
incomplete or unbalanced in nature due to entry and/or exit of forecast experts. Suppose 
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the combination methods are directly implemented on unbalanced panels without 
properly allowing for the unbalance structure of the data. Then a comparison of combined 
forecasts and related statistics are in general misleading because they are computed 
implicitly using different sets of balance panels. This is particularly problematic when the 
main aim is to compare the performance of different forecast combination methods. 
In this chapter, the three forecasting exercises do not have this issue, since the same exact 
data sets are used in each exercise. Structural Model has the strength of forecasting the 
patterns. ARIMA and Trend line are closer to Actual compared to Structural Model in 
selected carrier and city-pair combination. 
As noted, the use of a simple average has proven to do as well as more sophisticated 
approaches. Certainly, there are situations where one method is more accurate than 
another. If such cases can be identified in advance, simple averages would be inefficient. 
3.2. Equal Weighted Model Averaging vs. Mean Square 
Weighted Model Averaging 
In this chapter, I exam equal weighted average and mean square weighted average to see 
which one performs better than the other. 
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Chart 3 .2 .1. 
AA ORO-SEA Energy Demand from 
Q1 1980- Q3 1994 
-.-Actual AA_EQ 
~Structural Model 
- AA_Energy Demand Trendline 
_,_AA Energy Demand ARIMA 
Chart 3.2.2 is equal weighted average of these three forecasts compared to Actual. 
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Chart 3.2.2.a 
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Chart 3.2.2.b 
AA ORO-SEA Energy Demand 
from Q1 1989 - Q3 1994 
-+-- Actual AA_EQ - Equal Weighted Average 
...-95% Confidence Interval low ~95% Confidence Interval higt 
120000000 .----------------------------------------------------. 
20000000 +---------------------------------------------------~ 
109 
Chart 3.2.3 is Mean Square Weighted Average of these three forecasts compared to Actual. The less 
the Mean Square is, the more weight it is given. 
MSE Weight 
AA Energy Demand Trend line 24,081 '758,364,080 36% 
AA Energy Demand ARIMA 26,460,659,407,815 34% 
AA Energy Demand Forecast Structural 
Model 34,808,314,211 '757 30% 
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Chart 3.2.4 is the comparison of Equal Weighted Average and Mean Square Weighted 
Average. We can see Equal Weighted Average perform as good as Mean Square 
Weighted Average as forecasting AA ORD-SEA Energy Demand in the Q1 1980 -Q3 
1994. 
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Chart 3.2.5 and Chart 3.2.6 are charts ofUA ORD-SEA, the actual energy demand shows 
strong seasonal demand, reaching peaks in the 3rd quarters and touching bottoms in the 
1st quarters. ARIMA Model predicts best among these three forecasts. When these three 
forecasts are combined together, a close to actual forecast is displayed. The majority 
actual fall in the 95% confidence of interval of equal weighted average of these three 
approaches. 
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Chart 3.2.6.a 
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MSE Weight 
UA Energy Demand Trend line 13,433,421,751,023 28% 
UA Energy Demand ARIMA 8,027,957,584,834 37% 
UA Energy Demand Forecast Structural 
Model 9,320,565,941, 776 35% 
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Chart 3 .2. 7 is the comparison of Equal Weighted Average and Mean Square Weighted 
Average of UA ORD-SEA Energy Demand from Q1 1980 -Q3 1994. We cannot see 
meaningful difference between the forecasts of Mean Square Weighted Average and 
Equal Weighted Average. 
120 
3.3. Model Averaging for ORD-SAN 
As noted, an equal weighted Model Averaging has proven to do as well as more 
sophisticated approaches under certain circumstance. We here see how to apply different 
model averaging under different circumstance for city pair ORD-SAN. 
From our Market Power chapter's findings, we know that in city-pair ORD-SAN, AA has 
59% market power, while UA has 41%. In this city pair, AA has more market power than 
UA, which is vice versa in city-pair ORD-SLC we first discussed. 
ORO-SAN 
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Chart 3.3.1 
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For AA ORD-SAN, Structural Model, ARIMA and Trend line forecast are very close. 
Under this circumstance, assigning more weight to Structural Model can allow us have an 
average forecast that predicts turning points and seasonality. Chart 3.3.2 shows forecast 
ofEqual Weighted Average. Chart 3.3.3 shows forecast of Optimized Weighted Average 
with 70% weight on Structural Model and 15% weight on ARIMA and Trend Line 
respectively. 
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Chart 3.3.3 
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Chart 3.3.4 shows that these three forecasting approaches for UA ORD-SAN are 
significantly diverse. It is not convincing to pick just one approach. Under circumstances 
like this, simple Equal Weighted Average is the smart choice, which will allow you make 
a conclusion quickly and fairly. Chart 3.3.5 proves well. 
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Chart 3.3.5 
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Chart 3.3.6 
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3.4. Conclusion 
This thesis is motivated by the consolidation since the commercial airline industry was 
deregulated in 1978. We discussed the aviation industry for better understanding of the 
important milestones in the industry development. We thus turn our focus on the review 
of dynamic and static models of market power. After that, we developed of a dynamic 
model of collusion in airport-pair routes for selected U.S. airlines. We select four 
city-pairs that American (AA) and United (UA) are dominant players. The four city pairs 
are Chicago O'hare International (ORD)-San Diego International Airport (SAN), 
Chicago O'hare International (ORD)-Seattle-Tacoma International (SEA), San Francisco 
International (SFO) and Chicago O'hare International (ORD)-Salt Lake City 
International (SLC). We showed UA has a relatively larger market power share in 
ORD-SEA, ORD-SFO and ORD-SLC compared to AA, especially in ORD-SEA, where 
UA's market share is 63%. In city -pair ORD-SAN, AA has a relatively larger market 
share which is 59%. In this chapter, we only look at all the city pairs in which American 
and United are dominant firms. In future work, we can extend the chapter to examine 
richer empirical settings in which, among other things, the city-pair routes are not 
dominated by two firms and in which exit-entry is impacted by firm conduct and market 
conditions. Our general framework also appears to be an appropriate and feasible 
vehicle for examining market conduct in other industries where merger and acquisition 
activities may be subject to FTC or US department of Justice oversight. 
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We discuss the Energy industry for deeper understanding of current world Energy supply 
and demand. We then focus on the use of our structure model for purposes of forecasting 
energy demands. We discuss and utilize various forecasting approaches that combined 
forecasts using various weighting schemes and we utilize these as well as specific 
forecasts from our structure model, ARIMA time series and simple time trends. We 
showed that under different circumstances, different weighting schemes have different 
merits. Equal Weighted Average performs as good as Mean Square Weighted Average in 
forecasting AA ORD-SEA Energy Demand in the Q1 1980 -Q3 1994. UA ORD-SEA 
also shows that simple Equal Weight Average can predict as well as more sophisticated 
Mean Square Weighted Average. We also showed case like AA ORD-SAN, in which 
Structural Model, ARIMA and Trend line forecast are very close in Q1 1980 -Q3 1994, 
Optimized Weighted Average that with more weight assigned to Structural Model is 
better than Equal Weighted Average, while case like UA ORD-SAN, in which Structural 
Model, ARIMA and Trend Line predict in different directions, Equal Weighted Model 
Average provides a simple and fare forecast. 
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